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Dual exchange rate regimes are not a phenomenon peculiar only to South Africa. In the 
past they have been implemented by the BLEU, France, Italy and the Netherlands in one 
form or another. More recently, multiple exchange regimes have been adopted by other 
developing countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela and Argentina. 
The rationale for imposing a two- or multi-tier exchange regime is to protect the balance 
of payments from volatile short-term capital flows due to political and economic 
uncertainty inherent in developing economies. 
The focus of this paper is on the insulation properties of dual market systems against 
foreign shocks. These shocks may take the form of foreign interest rate increases or 
increases in foreign perceptions of risk. An implication of these insulation properties is that 
the monetary authorities are able to pursue a monetary policy independent of external 
constraints. 
Section 2 presents an overview of the literature on dual market systems. Since the 
effectiveness of a two-tier system depends on complete market seperation between the 
official and financial markets, reference is made to this underlying assumption implicit in 
most models of dual exchange rate systems. A second underlying assumption viz: that of a 
neutral intervention policy is also briefly discussed. 
As regards the insulation of domestic interest rates against foreign interest rate increases, 
the literature appears divided. Gros' (1988) arbitrage flow model showed that insulation 
was only temporary and that in the · long run domestic interest rates would rise. On the 
other hand, Marion's (1981) short-run portfolio - balance approach showed that wealth 
and interest-income effects raised domestic interest rates in response to a foreign interest 
rate increase. 
Section 3 of this paper presents an overview of the dynamics of the South African financial 
rand mechanism. Mention is made of the two parallel markets in financial rands viz. the 
cash and securities markets. 
Section 4 of this paper tests the theoretical conclusions from Section 2 for the South 
African economy. The regression results however do not support the assertions made by 
either Marion or Gros. The findings support the hypothesis that domestic interest rates 
are indeed insulated against foreign interest rate shocks. 
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Further empirical tests conducted in Section 4 focus on the ability of the two-tier system 
to insulate domestic interest rates and the equity market against increased risk. 
A notational framework is used to capture the response of domestic interest rates to 
increased perceptions in risk. (i) 
where 
jR:} j µ = i (~)i 
- ! 
jR:} jµ only if /r (~) > /r (i). 
The tests conducted found that the rate of change in the financial rand discount exceeded 
the rate of change in the domestic intere~t rate. · The inference drawn from this is that the 
monetary authorities have greater autonomy against external shocks in setting the 
domestic rate of interest. If risk were to increase, the monetary authorities would be able 
to set domestic interest rates lower, provided that /r (~~e) > /r (i) . 
(i) R - is risk 
u - is the expected return to non-residents for holding domestic assets 
i - is the 90-day trade finance rate 
CRe - is the expected commercial rand rate of exchange 
FR - the financial rand rate of exchange. 
SECTION 2 
2.1 MECHANICS OF A DUAL EXCHANGE RATE SYSTEM 
The dual exchange rate mechanism has .primarily been adopted to tackle the problem of 
destabilizing capital flows. Thus, a separate exchange market for capital and current 
account transactions is proposed. The system is characterized by an official exchange rate 
for current account transactions (which may be free-floating, fixed or managed) as well as 
a financial exchange rate for capital account transactions. This financial exchange rate is a 
free floating rate which removes pressure from official reserves caused by large shifts in 
capital flows, while at the same time insulating foreign trade from exchange rate 
fluctuations and eliminating the need for inefficient discretionary restrictions on capital 
transactions. 
Thus any shock resulting in a capital outflow would occur through the financial exchange 
market, the effect of which is to depre~iate the financial exchange rate. There would, 
however, be no effect on the official reserves, and hence on the official exchange rate. In 
this way foreign trade is insulated from these capital shocks. It is important, however, to 
mention that the above discussion assumes that complete market separation is indeed 
possible. The implications of this assumption will be dealt with later. 
The mechanics of the dual rate system can be shown by way of the following expression: 1 
Where: 
µ 
µ = i CRe~ 1-T) + FR~FR R FR Equation 1 
expected return to non-residents for holding domestic assets over a given 
period of time. 
Adapted from Lanyi (1975) and Kantor and Barr (1983) 
4 
domestic rate of interest at a given time period 
CRe average expected spot official exchange rate applicable to interest payments 
during a given time period. 




tax rate applicable to non-residents on income earned (interest payments 
and profits) 
spot financial rate of exchange at a given time period. 
The exchange rates are defined as foreign currency per unit of domestic currency. 
International capital movements respond to changes in the financial exchange rate as a 
result of two separate motives on the part of economic units involved. The first of these is 
the rate of return motive. In the expression above this is defined as: 
µ = ~ CRe~ft-T) Equation 2 
This implies that the effective rate of return on foreign investment is a function of the 
proportionate spread between the official ( commercial) and financial exchange rates. This 
is the case if earnings on foreign investment are repatriated at the official exchange rate2• 
Thus, a depreciation of the financial exchange rate would increase the effective return on 
foreign investment (and hence result in capital inflows) while an appreciation of the 
financial exchange rate would decrease the effective return facillitating capital outflows. 
The second way in which a change in the financial exchange rate influences capital flows is 
through the capital gains motive (the second term in Equation 1). Thus, if economic 
agents expect the financial exchange rate to appreciate over the tenure of the investment, 
2 Earnings may however be repatriated at the financial exchange rate as has indeed 
occurred in the BLEU for short periods during the early seventies. It is worth 
pointing out that earnings repatriation is a capital flow that generally occurs via the 
official rate. Thus out earlier assumption of complete market separation must be an 
unrealistic one in practice. 
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capital gains would be made and funds would continue to flow into the country. 
Conversely, if the financial exchange rate were expected to depreciate, the flow of funds 
would be in the reverse direction. 
The financial exchange rate may be quoted at a discount or a premium to the official rate. 
In either case the results above are unaffected. An increase in the premium would lower 
the effective rate of return on investment by foreign investors, while an increase in the 
discount would increase the effective rate 'of return on investment by non-residents. 
2.2 INCOMPLETE MARKET SEPARATION 
Implicit in the theoretical models of dual markets is the assumption that perfect m.arket 
separation exists. In reality however, perfect separation of the markets is virtually 
impossible. As was mentioned earlier, interest payments or dividend payments, although 
returns to capital, generally occur at the official rate. Furthermore, payments related to 
capital service or royalties also occur at the official rate. If these payments are to be 
effected via the financial rate of exchange, the rate of return motive discussed above ceases 
to be an investment incentive for non-residents. In the South African context, it is this 
rate of return motive that compensates rton-residents for their negative perceptions of the 
South African political situation. Failure to provide an incentive to foreign investors in 
this way must surely penalize the South African economy in terms of lost investment 
opportunities and hence economic growth. 
Swoboda (1974) points out that if interest earnings are repatriated at the official rate, a 
link is established between the two exchange rates which makes separation between 
domestic interest rates and foreign returns possible even with perfect capital mobility. It is 
this separation between domestic and foreign returns that forms the crux of the discussion 
in Section 4 of this paper. 
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Certain types of international transfers, while technically current account items, can easily 
be used as vehicles for the acquisition of foreign assets. Remittances of savings by foreign 
workers, family remittances and tourist e~penditure are such transfers. If these items were 
to be included in the financial exchange market, this would do away with the threat that 
the official market poses as a channel through which capital movements occur. However, 
conducting certain current account transactions - such as tourism - at a different exchange 
rate from others (such as commodity trade) does involve a palpable distortion of relative 
prices. (Lanyi, 1975, p. 720). 
For example, if the official rate is quoted as 50 USc/Rand and the financial rate at 25 
USc/Rand, a US tourist to South Africa could buy goods valued at Rl00,00 for $25,00, 
while a -US importer would pay $50,00 for the same goods. Alternatively, a US tourist 
could buy SA shares in New York and sell these same shares in South Africa, the proceeds 
being used for the acquisition of domestic goods. Unless the financial rand mechanism was 
effectively policed, the US tourist could purchase goods (normally traded at the official 
rate) with money balances designated financial rands. 
Trade financing is another capital item that is always conducted at the official exchange 
rate. "Leads" and "lags" in the settlement of commercial claims, or variations in the 
initial terms of the commercial financing ~an be responsible for large, short-term, 
speculative capital movements. If, for example, the commercial rate of exchange is 
expected to depreciate, there will be speculative capital outflows before the depreciation 
occurs. As trade financing is conducted at the official rate and since the dual exchange 
mechanism is unable to insulate the current account against speculative movements, 
quantitative restrictions or intervention in the commercial market by the authorities may 
be necessary. 
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However, controls on "leads" and "lags" such as fixing the terms of payment by law -
interfere with the freedom of exporters and importers to determine mutually convenient 
terms; as well as being cumbersome and costly to enforce. 3 It is clear that even though 
trade financing is a capital item, it mus.t be effected at the official rate of exchange. It 
would not be possible for trade financing _to occur at the financial rate as this would imply 
that most trade must be conducted at the financial rate. 4 
A major implication of incomplete market separation is that the dual exchange market 
becomes less effective in protecting the official reserves against speculative disturbances. 
This however does not negate the primary function of the dual market, but ra.ther 
necessitates quantitative controls which are more costly to administer than a dual exchange 
market with perfect separation. 
2.3 OFFICIAL INTERVENTION AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
CONSIDERATIONS 
A_further implicit assumption in the theoretical models of dual markets is that a broadly 
neutral intervention policy is pursued and that effective implementation of such a policy is 
feasible. 
The rationale behind such a policy is that it ensures overall balance of payments 
equilibrium, with an imbalance on the current account being exactly offset by an equal 
imbalance of opposite sign on the capital account. Furthermore, it ensures a stable official 
rate of exchange which has important trade implications. It is however important to note 
that neutral intervention is only necessary if the object of policy is to have a pegged 
commercial rate of exchange. 
a Footnote 21. Lanyi (1975). 
4 Countries such as Mexico and Venezuela have adopted a dual exchange system 
whereby some goods (non-essential imports and exports) have been shifted from the 
official to the financial market. See Dornbusch (1986). 
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In the absence of a neutral intervention policy it would become increasingly more difficult 
for the monetary authorities to peg the official rate of exchange. This would be due to the 
resultant changes in international reserves. 
The dynamics of the neutral intervention policy is drawn on the work by Fleming (1971), 
Barattieri and Ragazzi (1971), and Lanyi (1975) and is presented below. 
2.3.1 The Case of a Neutral Intervention Policy 
The neutral intervention policy assumes intervention by the monetary authorities in both 
the official and financial markets. Consider the case where the current account is in 
surplus (deficit). Any foreign exchange surplus (deficit) on the current account may be 
sold (bought) in the financial exchange market in order to maintain the level of reserves 
and official rate of exchange. The increased supply of foreign exchange ( due to the sale of . 
reserves) to the financial market causes the financial exchange rate to appreciate. In this 
case, it is clear that the stock of international reserves has remained constant (and hence 
the official exchange rate). This result is also supported by Decaluwe and Steinherr (1976). 
Swoboda (1974) and Barattieri and Ragazzi (1971) however argue that an unaltered level of 
international reserves will not ensure that the balance of payments has a neutral effect on 
the monetary base; instead, there will be variations tending to aggravate the · current 
account disequilibrium which could of course be offset by monetary intervention. 
In order to establish what effect the b.alance of payments has on the monetary base, we 
need to know whether the financial rate is quoted at a premium or a discount. This can be 
determined by looking at what the state of the balance of payments would be if all 
transactions had been quoted at the officfal rate. 
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If all transactions are conducted at the official rate of exchange and the overall balance of 
payments is in surplus, the financial rate would be quoted at a premium. In the reverse 
case, the financial rate would be quoted at a discount. 
Given then that the overall balance of payments is in deficit ( current account surplus < 
capital outflows), application of the neutral intervention policy will ensure the intervention 
agency some profit. 
Assume for example that the official rate and the financial rate are quoted at 50 USc/ 
1 Rand and 25 USc/1 Rand respectively. Furthermore, assume that the surplus on the 
current account is $100. The effective cost of these reserves would be R200 ( at official rate 
of exchange). If the monetary authorities now sell the $100 in the financial market they 
would receive R400. The net effect is a R200 profit.s Since the intervention agency has 
made a profit this implies a reduction in the money base. In order to maintain the money 
base at its initial level, an open-market purchase would be the appropriate policy measure. 
Hence, an unaltered level of international reserves will not ensure that the balance of 
payments has a neutral effect on the monetary base. 
Thus far, we have shown that the finan~ial rate is expected to increase (appreciate) when 
the current account is in surplus. 6 However, .this result is at odds with the analysis of 
Flood (1978). In Flood's model, the· current account is the exact measure of the amount of 
intervention required for the domestic monetary authority to maintain the fixed current 
account exchange rate. A current account surplus requires that the monetary authority 
purchase international reserves equal to the surplus, producing an equal increase in the 
domestic supply of high powered money. In order for _the expanded money supply to be 
s The financial rate would, however, tend to appreciate. Thus, the quoted rate may 
be 30 USc/1 Rand. For simplicity, I have assumed no change in the financial rate. 
6 Assuming a neutral intervention policy is being adopted. 
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absorbed into domestic portfolios, the financial exchange rate must depreciate. The 
depreciated financial rate reduces the opportunity cost of holding money and raises 
domestic wealth due to capital gains on traded securities which further accommodates the 
increased money supply. Thus, Flood concludes that the larger is the value of the current 
account surplus, the larger is the expected depreciation of the financial rate. 
Flood's model assumes that an increase in international reserves increases the money base 
and .hence money supply. However, an increase in international reserves might well not 
affect money supply via the money base, but merely change the composition of the money 
base. Thus, if a country has a current account surplus, the rate of growth of credit creation 
may not change but the degree of accommodation required from the Central Bank may 
well decrease. In the reverse case of a current account deficit, accommodation . may 
increase while the rate of domestic credit creation is unaffected. 7 
2.3.1.1 Criticisms of the Neutral Intervention Policy 
Lanyi (1975) has argued that a neutral intervention policy of the type discussed above may 
however not be adopted by the monetary authorities. The reason given is that any 
systematic intervention of the sort proposed would increase speculative movements in both 
the financial and official markets. Thus, assuming a current account deficit, intervention 
would take the form of foreign exchange purchases in the financial market. The increased 
demand for foreign exchange would increase its price relative · to domestic currency and 
depreciate the financial rate. The increased spread between the official and financial 
exchange rates may be taken as an indication by speculators that the official rate would be 
devalued at some later date, and thus consequently provoke additional speculation through 
the official market. 8 Furthermore, an increased spread would tend to increase the 
7 
8 
For a detailed discussion of the link between the money base, money supply and 
credit creation; see Whittaker, J. (1987). 
Speculation may take the form of changes in "leads" and "lags" in trade payments 
as well as changes in foreign current account balances in the domestic currency. 
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incentives for evasion and would thus become impossible to maintain. While in theory it is 
conceivable that a spiral of ever-increasing pressure on official reserves could be offset by 
ever-increasing official intervention, this is apparently not considered by monetary 
authorities to be a manageable policy. 
Lanyi proposes a "variable" intervention policy as a means of stemming speculative flows. 
In this case, intervention is not systematic. However, he argues that until such a policy of 
neutral intervention is actually implemented, it is impossible to tell whether such a policy 
could defeat a heavy speculative movement. 
Fleming (1971) refers to a "reverse transfer problem" that arises in connection with the 
neutral i-ntervention policy discussed above. If a country has an increasing deficit on its 
current account, it might find that it has to carry out larger and larger proportionate 
depreciations in its financial exchange rate in order to obtain a given addition to the flow 
of foreign exchange, accruing to its central reserves, from intervention in the financial 
exchange market. There might even come a point at which any further depreciation would 
reduce rather than increase that flow. 
One would expect that successive depreciations of the financial rate would increase the 
effective return to foreigners and increase their demand for dot\lestic securities. In the 
same context, domestic residents would give up more of their remaining holdings of foreign 
assets due to capital gains considerations. However, if it is the desire of economic agents to 
maintain a geographical diversification of asset holdings, merely raising the effective yields 
in the domestic country relative to those abroad may not be enough to induce foreigners to 
invest still more capital in the home country. By the same token, domestic investors may 
also be unwilling to give up more of their holdings of foreign assets. 
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2.4 MONETARY POLICY UNDER DUAL EXCHANGE RATES 
The literature appears divided on the issue of the effectiveness of monetary policy under 
dual exchange rates. For this reason it is important to examine the role of monetary policy 
under different models of dual exchange regimes. In this regard, insight is drawn from 
Barattieri and Ragazzi (1971), Cumby (rn84), Swoboda (1974) and Gros (1988). 
Barattieri and Ragazzi use the traditional Mundellian framework to assess the effects of an 
expansionary monetary policy under both unified (fixed) and dual exchange rates. They 
conclude that in the case of a unified (fixed) exchange rate regime, monetary policy can 
only have a temporary effect in increasing income levels within the economy. However, 
under a dual exchange rate system monetary policy can be used to sustain a certain level of 
income provided that the monetary authorities follow a neutral intervention policy. The 
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Mundell Model - Monetary Policy 
FIGURE 1 
Point 'a' in Figure 1 corresponds to both internal and external equilibrium. 
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In the case of an expansionary monetary policy under unified (fixed) exchange rates, the 
LM curve shifts right to L1M1 . The temporary decrease in interest rates results in a 
capital outflow and hence a capital account deficit, while the increase in income results in a 
current account deficit. Hence, an overall deficit on the balance of payments prevails. 
This deficit puts downward pressure on the rate of exchange but if the authorities wish to 
maintain a pegged rate, the money supply must reverse and equilibrium once again 
established at point 'a'. In this framework the money supply reverses automatically as 
reserves flow out of the country. The model is a fixed price model and assumes perfect 
capital mobility. 
The mechanism under a dual exchange rate system is no different from that discussed 
above except for one exception viz. a neutral intervention policy that is implicit in the 
discussion of dual exchange systems. The overall balance of payments deficit implies that 
the financial rate of exchange is quoted at a discount. Thus, if the monetary authorities 
wish to maintain the income level at Y2, purchases of foreign exchange in the financial 
market must take place in order to maintain internal blance at point 'b' (intersection of IS 
and L_M curves). Since the financial rate of exchange is quoted at a discount, the 
intervention agency records a profit. 10 This has the effect of putting downward pressure 
on the money base thus necessitating an open-market purchase to maintain the money 
supply at its initial level. Thus, an expansionary monetary policy can be effective in 
.. 
sustaining a given level of income in the long run while maintaining the level of reserves at 
some constant level. 11 
10 See my earlier discussion on this issue for a numerical example. 
11 For a criticism of the neutral intervention policy see my earlier discussion. 
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Swoboda also uses the Mundellian framework in ascertaining the effectiveness of monetary 
policy under a dual exchange rate system. He however examines the ability of the 
monetary authorities to lower the pri~e level given an unchanging foreign monetary 
environment. Figure 1 helps to explain the adjustment process. 
Assuming that with initial equilibrium at a (internal - and external balance) the 
monetary authorities decrease the money supply consistent with L11M11 in order to lower 
the price level to P 3 . A position of quasi-equilibrium is attained at point C in figure 1 
with an attendant payments surplus (due to the decrease in money supply) and reserve 
inflows ( due to the higher rate of interest). In order to maintain the system at point C , it 
is necessary for the Central Bank to sell bonds to the public to sterilize the inflow of 
reserves. Note that an open market sale of bonds decreases money supply, while an inflow 
of reserves expands money supply. 12 
Under a unitary fixed exchange rate regime the required rate of sterilization depends on the 
interest-sensitivity of capital flows. As the latter increases, the rate of sterilization 
operations must also increase. · As the interest-sensitivity of capital flows tends to infinity 
so does the rate of sterilization operations. Thus, it is clear that continuous sterilization 
becomes impossible in a world of perfect capital_ mobility. 13 
A dual exchange rate system on the other hand, can increase the scope for monetary 
independence in the SHORT RUN as it eliminates the induced flow of capital on reserves. 
Thus, a capital inflow will result in an appreciation of the financial exchange rate. Because 
the financial rate is free-floating the capital account will always be in equilibrium. 
12 
13 
See my earlier criticism of the effect of increased reserves on money supply. 
(Section 2, page 10) · 
If a country has a perpetual overall surplus on its balance of payments, open market 
sales of bonds cannot continue indefinitely as government has a limit on the public 
debt. 
15 
Thus the required rate of sterilization now only depends on the current account 
disequilibrium. If the current account is initially in equilibrium, the required rate of 
sterilization is lower than that under a unitary fixed exchange rate. An alternative to 
sterilization is intervention in the financial exchange market. Thus, in the situation 
discussed above, the overall surplus on the balance of payments results in the financial rate 
being quoted at a premium. The sale in the free market of foreign exchange acquired at 
the official rate then results in a loss to the intervention agency. Thus, even though 
intervention in the financial market provides a substitute for conventional sterilization, it 
is however a costly substitute. To make up for the loss incurred by. the intervention 
agency, it would have to buy bonds from the public to maintain the money supply at a 
constant level. 
Cumby (1984) also examines the effect of monetary policy on domestic prices as his 
measure of its effectiveness. He however makes use of the portfolio-balance approach 
unlike the Mundellian approach used by Swoboda. Irrespective of the various models used, 
both Swoboda and Cumby reach similar conclusions viz. that monetary policy is effective 
in the short run but not in the long run. 
Cumby's model emphasizes the wealth effects of changes in the financial exchange rate 
( defined as domestic currency per unit of foreign currency) as the channel through which 
disturbances affect the domestic economy. He thus adopts Metzler's portfolio balance rule 
whereby agents are assumed to allocate their financial wealth between domestic money and 
interest-bearing assets. The short run and long run effects of an unanticipated 
open-market purchase of securities by the central bank is the measure adopted to ascertain 
the effectiveness of monet~ry policy. This effect is depicted diagrammatically below. 





e1 = o 
R = 0 
'--~~-,-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~RESERVES 
Unanticipated .Open-market Purchase 
FIGURE 2 
SOURCE : Cumby (1984) 
The e = 0 locus depicts the values of reserves and the financial rate consistent with asset 
market equilibrium and a stationary financial rate; while the R = 0 locus depicts the 
values of reserves and the financial rate consistent with equilibrium in the goods market 
and with a balanced current account. 
The long-run equilibrium, E , is disturbed by an open-market purchase of 
interest-bearing assets. The effect of this is to increase the value of the stock of domestic 
credit which is equal to the value of securities purchased. Private financial wealth is thus 
unchanged at E and the current account remains balanced at all points along the R = 0 
locus. It is assumed that the interest payments the central bank gains by the open-market 
purchases are redistributed to the private sector as lump-sum transfer payments in order 
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to maintain the level of disposable income. Furthermore, due to the change in relative 
asset supplies there is now an excess supply of money at all points along the e = O locus. 
Hence, at each level of reserves a higher ( depreciated) value of the financial rate is needed 
to restore money-market equilibrium. The e = 0 locus thus shifts left to el= 0. 
At the time of the open-market purchase, the resultant portfolio change results in an 
l 
excess demand for foreign exchange. The reasoning behind this is the desire of private 
sector individuals to maintain a desired money to foreign assets ratio. -The effect of this 
portfolio change is a depreciation of the financial rate. Due to this depreciation, the dual 
exchange system maintains the stock of international reserves at a constant level. Thus, in 
the short run, the financial rate overshoots its long run level and equilibrium is reached at 
El and s1s1 (the stable arm associated with a higher stock of domestic credit) in Figure 2. 
The increase ( depreciation) of the financial rate, however, increases the wealth of private 
sector individuals hence resulting in increased absorption and a current account deficit. 
This increased absorption puts upward pressure on domestic prices (hence reducing real 
w~alth) resulting in a switch away from domestic goods. 
This demand switch has the effect of decreasing the stock of international reserves 
(increased imports) while the adjustment to the new long-run equilibrium results in an 
appreciation of the financial rate. The associated decline in real wealth reduces absorption 
and therefore reduces domestic prices over time. This price decline continues until the 
original price level is restored at EU (long run equilibrium). 
The inability of the central bank to influence the price level in the long run is not due to an 
inability to control the money stock. 14 At EU the higher (depreciated) financial rate 
14 Even in the Ion& run the authorities are able to maintain a certain level of income 
(stock of money). This result is consistent with that of Barattieri and Ragazzi 
(1971). 
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implies that the domestic interest rate must be lower than at 
INTEREST-PARITY expression below clarifies this point : 
where 
I. '* CR 
't'1=1 • rm 
i - domestic interest rate 
i* - foreign interest rate 
CR commercial rate of exchange ( assumed fixed) 
FR - spot financial rand rate of exchange 
E . The 
Equation 3 
A higher financial rate is shown to reduce the domestic interest rate. Thus, with real 
output unchanged, asset-market equilibrium requires that a lower domestic interest rate 
be accompanied by a larger monetary base. The long run reserve loss following an open 
market purchase is therefore less than one for one. 
The present framework can be used to examine the effect of a speculative disturbance on 
the cur:rent account and domestic prices. Cumby argues that dual rates are not successful 
in insulating either the current account ?r domestic prices from speculative disturbances. 
He models a speculative attack as a change in agents' expectations concerning future policy 
to be pursued by the domestic monetary authority. We assume that at time t 0 the 
.. 
economy is disturbed by agents' expectations that at some time, t 1 , the monetary 
authority will engage in an open market expansion of the money stock. 
The effect of this speculative disturbance is no different to that presented above. Thus, at 
t 0 , the economy moves to Et , as the expected future monetary expansion creates an 
excess demand for foreign exchange and results in an immediate depreciation of the 
financial rate. The resultant wealth effect results in an increase in aggregate demand and 
domestic prices. If the agents' expectations at t 1 are realized, the adjustment continues 
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with a continuing current account deficit and appreciating financial exchange rate until 
equilibrium is reached at EU . If however expectations are not realized, agents' must 
revise their expectations. If this revision occurs prior to t 1 , the financial rate must 
appreciate immediately with the economy jumping vertically to E111 on SS in Figure 2. 
The capital loss that results from the appreciation reduces absorption and prices. A 
current account surplus results as the economy begins to accumulate reserves and the 
financial rate depreciates until the initial long :run equilibrium, E , is restored. Dual 
exchange markets are thus unsuccessful in insulating either the current account or domestic 
prices from speculative disturbances. 
Finally, Gros {1988) explains the effect 9f an expansionary monetary policy by way of an 
arbitrage flow model. 15 He argues that an increase in domestic credit will be offset in the 
long run by an equivalent loss in reserves. This is because domestic credit is determined by 
the fixed (assumed) commercial exchange rate. Thus, an increase in domestic credit will 
put downward pressure on the commercial rate and thus, in order to reverse this pressure, 
will require an equivalent loss in reserves. Furthermore, since the behaviour of prices and 
thus the trade account is also determined by the fixed commercial rate, the reserve loss can 
be caused only by arbitrage activity between the financial and official markets, which in 
turn has to be induced by a differential between the financial and commercial exchange 
rates. An important pro.position of this model is that the steady-state differential is 
always zero. This is so since market· separation is impossible in the long-run. 
Thus, an increase in domestic credit will result in a depreciation of the financial rate 
because the required outflow of reserves can take place only if there is a large differential 
between the rates. After the initial discreet depreciation of the financial rate, ·it begins to 
appreciate until the differential again disappears. 
15 For a brief description of this model see my discussion on "Foreign Interest Rate 
Shocks and Monetary Policy". · 
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This result is different to the no-leakage models proposed by Barattieri and Ragazzi 
(1971), Swoboda (1974) and Cumby (1'984) above. In those models, the effect of an 
expansionary monetary policy was to permanently depreciate the financial exchange rate. 
In Gros' model, an expansionary monetary policy depreciates the financial rate only 
temporarily. 
Thus far we have only discussed monetary policy in the context of the domestic economy. 
However, we have neglected the use and feasibility of monetary policy as a means of 
insulating the domestic economy against foreign shocks viz: changes in foreign interest 
rates and changes in world prices. It is to these considerations that we next turn. 
2.5 FOREIGN SHOCKS AND MONETARY POLICY 
2.5.1 Foreign Interest Rate Shocks and Monetary Policy 
Gros (1988) criticises existing models on the effects of dual exchange rates as these have 
not challenged the assumption that the authorities can succeed in separating the two 
markets; or what amounts to the same thing that private arbitrage activity has no 
important consequences. He argues further that taking private arbitrage activity into 
account leads to the conclusion that dual exchange rates ( as well as capital controls) could 
succeed only temporarily in dampening the effects ( on the domestic goods market) of 
shocks to financial or other markets. Thus, in the long run, private arbitrage activity stops 
only if the discount or premium of the financial rate disappears. 
The effect of an increase in international interest rates, i* , on the exchange rate 
differential and on the domestic interest rate, is now considered. The adjustment 
mechanism is equivalent to that of an increase in domestic credit with an unanticipated 
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increase in international interest rates leading to a depreciation of the financial rate. The 
rate depreciates in order to discourage capital outflows and to encourage inflows. 16 The 
initial differential however, disappears over time as the financial rate appreciates (at a 
decreasing rate) until it is once again equal to the commercial rate. The steady-state 
differential will be zero due to arbitrage activity and incomplete market separation. 
The reserve flows induced by this differential reduce the money supply and thus raise 
domestic interest rates. This result thus implies that dual exchange rates cannot protect 
domestic financial markets from the effects of disturbances in international financial 
markets. 
However, following a foreign interest rate shock, if the aim of the monetary authorities is to 
keep the-domestic interest rate below that of the international interest rate, an increase in 
domestic credit ( and hence a depreciating financial rate) could achieve this objective only if 
it comes as a surprise. However, the effect of this measure would only be temporary. 
Thus, monetary policy is only effective in the short run in insulating the domestic economy 
from foreign interest rate shocks. 
Furthermore, if in response to an increase in foreign interest rates the authorities tried to 
neutralize the effects of arbitrage flows on domestic interest rates by increasing the rate of 
domestic credit expansion, the differential between the two exchange rates would widen, 
thus increasing the arbitrage flows. Any attempt by the authorities to conduct an 
independent money supply policy would then lead to an unstable spiral of depreciations of 
the financial rate and increasing arbitrage flows. A dual exchange rate regime (with a fixed 
commercial exchange rate) imposes, therefore, essentially the same constraints on the 
conduct of monetary policy as a unified exchange rate. 17 
16 
17 
Gros assumes a starting point where the differential is zero. 
Gros {1988) pp.456. See also Section 2.6.4 on Evasion of capital controls to see how 
arbitrage flows reduce the differential between the official and financial markets. 
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Marion {1981), 18 has used a portfolio-balance model in her attempt to examine the effect 
of a foreign interest-rate shock on the domestic economy. Her conclusions are somewhat 
different to those of Gros, since in this model the adjustment to a foreign interest rate 
shock depends on the type of foreign bond that is included in investors' respective 
portfolios. In the case of foreign consols, the dual exchange system insulates the domestic 
economy against foreign interest rate shocks. However, if foreign bonds of short term 
' 
maturity are demanded by domestic residents, then the reverse is true and the two-tier 
market does not insulate the domestic economy. 19 
Consider the case of the inclusion of foreign consols in domestic portfolios. If the foreign 
interest rate rises, the expected rate of return on foreign assets increases while their value is 
simultaneously reduced. These effects trigger a portfolio reallocation, with the financial 
rate depreciating by an amount that leaves the rate of return and the domestic currency 
value of residents' foreign bond holdings unchanged. There is thus no wealth effect to act 
as a transmission channel for foreign financial disturbances. 
In_ addition, since domestic residents receive a fixed foreign currency coupon payment on 
their foreign bond holdings, and these proceeds are repatriated at the pegged commercial 
exchange rate, the two-tier exchange market eliminates the interest income channel as a 
transmission mechanism. 
Finally, since goods are traded at the fixed commercial rate of exchange, there is no way 
that a portfolio reallocation can alter the domestic currency price of traded goods and 




This is a short-run adjustment model. 
This conclusion is consistent with that of Gros. 
Marion {1981), pp.67. 
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If domestic residents hold only foreign bonds of short term maturity, then the two-tier 
exchange market does not insulate the domestic economy. In this case, an increase in the 
foreign interest rate alters domestic rates and depreciates the financial exchange rate. The 
depreciation of the financial rate leads to ·capital gains for domestic residents due to the 
increased domestic value of their foreign assets. This wealth effect results in increased 
spending which pushes up the price of domestic goods. National income also increases as a 
result of the wealth effect supporting a rise in domestic interest rates. 
Furthermore, the increase in the foreign interest rate also increases the value of 
interest-income repatriated through the pegged commercial rate resulting in increased 
spending, increased domestic prices and national income. In this case therefore, wealth and 
interest-income effects become the transmission channels. In practice, since most 
countries operating a two-tier system generally allow assets of various maturities to be 
traded at the financial rate, the two-tier market will not insultate the domestic economy 
from foreign interest rate shocks. 21 
2.s.2 Deviations from Interest Rate Parity 
It is necessary to incorporate within this theoretical overview a discussion of political risk 
.. 
as well as the effective tax imposed by existing forms of capital controls. Up until now, 
interest rate differentials between countries have been assumed to depend on exchange rate 
changes. This idea is consistent with the interest parity conditions for both unified and 
dual exchange rate systems. These are .presented below in Equations 4 and 5 respectively. 
21 See Appendix A for a discussion o{ foreign interest rate shocks under both fixed and 
flexible unified exchange rate regimes. 
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Unified Exchange Regime: 
Where : 
. '* CR - CRe 
1 -l = CR *100 
i domestic interest rate 
i* foreign interest rate 
CRe - expected future spot commercial rate 
CR - spot commercial rate of exchange. 
Dual Exchange Regime : 
. '* FR FR - FRe 22 
1
-
1 CRe = FR *100 
Where : 
FRe expected future spot financial rate 
FR spot financial rate of exchange. 
Equation 4 
Equation 5 
Dooley and Isard (1980) and Phylaktis (1988) attribute variations in interest parity to 
political risk as well as the effective tax imposed by capital controls. The equation used to 
test this assertion is given by Equation 6. 23 
i -i* - et= f (DIFFPR + DIFF cc) Equation 6 
Where: 




Adapted from Lanyi (1975), Kantor and Barr (1983). 
This equation is consistent under both unified and dual exchange regimes. However, 
in the case of the latter, it is assumed that complete market separation is possible 





the interest rate differential attributed to political risk associated with 
future capital controls. 
the interest rate differential attributed to existing capital controls. 
the expected rate of change in the exchange rate defined as foreign 
currency vs. domestic currency. If a dual exchange system is adopted, 
et , is the expected change in the financial rate of exchange. 
However, if it is assumed that interest payments are made at the commercial rate of 
exchange, the exchange rate differential, is by definition, a measure of political risk. 







DIFFPR =do+ d1B + d2WR + d3WNR 
Stock of domestic currency claims against the domestic government (i.e. 
total government debt). 
Wealth of domestic residents 
Wealth of non-residents 
Effective tax imposed by capital controls already in place. 
The interest differential due to political· risk thus depends on the stock of gross claims 
against the domestic government and the distribution of world wealth between the 
domestic private sector and non-residents. 
The interest differential due to capital controls was represented by zero-one dummy 
variables, 24 with the tightness of each measured through a multi-step scale. Thus, if 
controls were very stringent, the dummy variable would have a value of 1 (or close to 1), 
24 Note that this measure of the effective tax of capital controls is rather an arbitrary 
measure. 
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while the dummy variable would have a value of zero if there were no controls. 
Both Dooley and Isard (1980) and Phylaktis (1988) found that both the existing and 
prospective controls combined, explained about 83% of the variation in interest rates. Of 
this 83% , Phylaktis found that in the case of Argentina, about one third of the variation 
between interest rates could be attributed to political risk, while the remaining two thirds 
of the variation was attributed to capital controls. 
In Section 4, a similar approach to that of Dooley and Isard and Phylaktis is taken to 
measure political and economic risk. In this case, the deviation from interest rate parity 
under a two-tier system is taken as this measure. The rationale for measuring risk is 
simply io examine the response of the financial rand discount to increased risk. If risk 
increases, the financial rand discount is expected to widen. 
2.5.3 Foreign Price Shocks and Monetary Policy 
It is the purpose of the present discussion to ascertain whether or not the dual exchange 
rate mechanism is able to insulate the domestic economy (primarily domestic prices) from 
foreign price increases. Furthermore, it is necessary to establish the effectiveness of 
monetary policy as an instrument to assist the domestic economy in its insulation against 
foreign price shocks. 
Marion's (1981) discussion on foreign price shocks shows that no exchange rate regime 
insulates home goods prices and national income from foreign price disturbances. In the 
case of both a dual - and uniform fixed-rate regime - the fixed exchange rate translates 
foreign price changes into new domestic currency prices for traded goods. In order to avoid 
the high prices of traded goods, individuals may substitute into domestic non-traded 
goods. The increased demand for these goods will however also increase their price. 
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In the case of uniform flexible-rate regimes, it is assumed that the exchange rate does not 
respond instantaneously to goods market disturbances. Thus, if foreign prices of traded 
goods increase, the effect on domestic prices will be no different to that discussed above 
under either dual - or unified fixed-rate regimes. 25 
Marion's assumption that" the goods market reacts more quickly than the asset market to a 
l 
foreign shock, is an unrealistic one. It is generally accepted that asset markets react more 
quickly than goods markets to foreign shocks. If this is the case, under· a uniform flexible 
exchange rate regime, a foreign price rise will result in an expected appreciation of the 
exchange rate insulating the goods market against the shock. Furthermore, under a dual 
exchange rate regime with a :floating official exchange rate, insulation against a foreign 
price rise will be through the official exchange rate. 
Swoboda (1974) addresses the issue of the effectiveness of monetary policy in insulating 














Imported Inflation and Monetary Policy 
FIGURE 3 
SOURCE: Swoboda (1974) 




Initially two assumptions are made: there are no capital movements, and real income and 
the terms of trade are constant. The notation used in Figure 3 is as follows : 
rate of change of domestic goods prices 
rate of change of traded goods prices 
II, DD and MM represent those combinations of rates of change of international 
and domestic goods prices that maintain equilibrium in the 
traded goods, domestic goods and money markets respectively. 
Initial equilibrium in Figure 3 is at the origin with foreign inflation equal to zero. If the 
foreign inflation rate now rises, 1ri corresponds to this increase. In order for full 
equilibrium to be achieved, it is necessary for all three curves to intersect at C . This 
would require an increase in the money supply which the authorities may not wish to do, as 
their policy objective is to maintain domestic inflation as close to zero as possible. Thus, in 
the absence of domestic credit creation, the source of the increase in the money supply is a 
steady rate of reserve inflow. In order to prevent the money supply from increasing, 26 
sterilization ( open-market sales) by the monetary authorities might be adopted, with a 
quasi-equilibrium being established at point B . As can be seen from Figure 3, point B 
- ' 
does not correspond to an inflation rate exactly equal to zero. The reason for this is due to 
the substitutability of traded - for non-traded goods. If the incidence of substitutability is 
. 
high, domestic residents will increase their demand for non-traded goods thus pushing up 
their prices. If, on the other hand, the incidence of substitutability is low, there might only 
be a small increase in the demand for domestic goods and hence a small increase in 
domestic prices. Thus, in terms of Figure 3, an increase in substitutability implies that 
point B will be close to point C . 
26 An increase in reserves may not affect money supply but may only affect levels of 
accommodation by the Central Bank. 
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If the assumption of zero capital movements is relaxed, the capital account surplus 
generated by higher domestic interest rates ( due to lower money supply) would require 
greater levels of sterilization27 by the authorities, to dampen money supply growth. This 
would be the case of a unitary fixed-rate regime. In a dual exchange rate regime, the rate 
of sterilization would be less due to the appreciation of the financial rate, stabilizing capital 
inflows due to the higher domestic rate of interest. 
The above discussion thus concludes that monetary policy exhibits limited power in 
insulating the domestic economy from foreign price shocks, with the dual rate regime 
exhibiting more insulating capabilities than the unified (fixed) rate regime. This is due to 
the lower rate of sterilization required to dampen money supply growth. 
2.6 DOMESTIC SHOCKS AND EXPECTATIONS FORMATION - DUAL 
RATES 
The following discussion attempts to establish the effects of : 
(1) an expected/unexpected devaluation of the commercial rate. 
(2) an expected increase in government spending, and 




Note however that sterilization may not continue indefinitely. 
Insight is drawn from the work of Dornbusch (1986), Lizondo (1987a) and Gros 
(1988). 
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2.6.1 Unexpected Devaluation of the Commercial Exchange 
Rate 
In the context of Gros' (1988) arbitrage flow model, an unexpected depreciation of the 
commercial rate leads to an immediate depreciation of the financial exchange rate. 
Whether or not the financial rate will depreciate by the same amount as the fall in the 
commercial rate, depends on whether the effects of the rising price level on the demand for 
mo~ey will be exactly offset by the increased inflows through the trade account . 
If the trade account reacts strongly to a devaluation of the commercial rate, as would be 
expected in a country where the proportion of tradeables in GNP is very high, the financial 
exchange rate would overshoot its long run equilibrium. The strong reaction of the trade 
account to the devaluation results in reserve inflows that can only be offset through 
arbitrage flows. Hence the overshooting of the financial rate. Over time, however, the 
financial rate appreciates and returns to its long run level where the steady-state 
differential is zero. 
This result is, in principle, no different to that obtained in the usual no-leakage models. In 
Lizondo's model where the exchange-rate differential is determined by wealth effects, a 
devaluation of the commercial rate will have no effect on the exchange-rate differential. 
Initially, however, the devaluation of the commercial rate would reduce the differential but 
the financial rate would continue to depreciate until the steady-state differential was 
re-established. 
In his model, Lizondo assumes that nominal financial wealth of the private sector 
comprises domestic money and foreign money. By definition, capital transactions are 
carried out at the financial rate where domestic money is exchanged for foreign money. 
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Thus, a devaluation of the commercial rate reduces the real stock of domestic money but 
does not affect the real stock of foreign money. In order to maintain portfolio equilibrium, 
the exchange-rate differential must fall. This happens as domestic residents sell foreign 
money balances for domestic money balances in the financial market, decreasing the 
domestic price of foreign exchange i.e. the financial rate appreciates and the differential 
falls . 
The initial fall in the differential and the real stock of domestic money results in a decrease 
in imports improving the balance of payments. However, this effect is only transitory as 
the improvement in the balance of payments will increase the real stock of domestic money 
resulting in an increase in the exchange rate differential until the steady-state differential 
is once again established. 
The major difference between Gros and Lizondo's approach is the assumption concerning 
the steady-state differential. In the case of the former, this steady-state differential is 
zero while in the latter, it is positive. 
2.6.2 Expected Devaluation of the Commercial Exchange 
Rate 
In the case of a future anticipated devaluation of the commercial exchange rate, the 
financial rate must depreciate at the time the market begins to expect the future 
devaluation. The differential that arises as the financial rate depreciates tends to lead to a 
loss of reserves because of the arbitrage flows. 29 The loss of reserves implies that the 
expected rate of devaluation has to increase, and the financial exchange rate will therefore 
continue to depreciate increasingly until the devaluation of the commercial rate takes 
place. 
29 See Gros (1988) 
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Kantor and Barr (1983) have expressed the above relationship in more concrete terms. 
Using the interest-parity condition (excluding capital gains) 30 the financial rate of 
exchange can. be expressed as a function of domestic and foreign interest rates as well as the 
expected commercial rate (Equation 8). 
Interest-Parity Condition for dual markets : 
.* _. CRe} 1-T) 
I - I 'R 
i* _ CRe} 1-T) 
r-- 'R 
~ · CRe(l-T) = FR 
Now, since the financial rate discount is given as : 
. · CR - FR 
FR disc = CR · 100 
by substituting equation 8 and 9 we get : 
i CR - ~ CRe(l-T) 
FR disc = --___,0 .... R...---- · 100 
Where: 
i* required world rate of return. 





CRe expected exchange value of the commercial rate over the times at 
which interest or dividend payments are received. 
T non-residents tax. 
FR Spot financial rate of exchange (foreign currency/domestic currency). 
CR Spot commercial rate of exchange. 
30 Assume a very short time horizon. 
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From Equation 10, for any given commercial exchange rate (CR), non-resident tax (T), 
home rate of return (i), and world rate of return (i*), the financial rate discount (FR disc) 
would narrow if the expected commercial rate (CRe) were to rise, and widen if CRe were 
to fall. 31 
To sum up, a future anticipated devaluation of the commercial exchange rate will result in 
a depreciation of the financial rate at the time the market begins to expect the future 
devaluation. The financial rate continues to depreciate until the devaluation of the 
commercial rate takes place. In the case of a future anticipated revaluation, the reverse 
holds. 
2.6.3 Expected Increase 1n Government Spending 
Dornbusch (1986) examines the expected increase in government spending, brought about 
by an increase in inflation tax revenue, via an increase in the rate of depreciation of the 
commei;cial exchange rate. He makes use of a portfolio-balance model in which only two 
assets: domestic money and foreign nominal interest-earning assets, constitute the asset 
market. Also, the exchange rate is defined as the domestic currency price relative to the 
foreign currency price. The diagrams below help to explain the adjustment process : 
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FIGURE 4(b) 
At the moment the increase in future government spending is expected, there is an 
immediate portfolio shift from money to foreign assets, which leads to a jump 
(depreciation) in the premium from poin~ E to A in Figure 4(a). At point A, the rate of 
depreciation of the financial rate is now higher than that of the commercial rate. This is 
shown in Figure 4(b) between T 0(E) and T~B). As a result of the portfolio shift out of 
money into foreign assets, the real stock of money balances falls while the financial rate 
continues to depreciate. This is depicted by the movement from A to B in Figure 4(a). 
When the economy arrives at point B, the more rapid rate of depreciation of the 
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commercial rate is implemented officially. In Figure 4(b) this effect is seen by the jump in 
the commercial exchange rate at T~B). In Figure 4(a), the adjustment is along J1J1 
until equilibrium is achieved at E1 , with some adjustment in the premium (i.e. 
appreciation of the financial rate). Returning to Figure 4(b) it can be seen that the rate of 
depreciation of the financial rate decreases after the official implementation of the 
increased rate of depreciation of the commercial rate (point B). Over the range T1(B) to 
TH(E1), the rate of depreciation of the commercial rate exceeds that the financial rate. 
However, the overall effect of these rates of depreciation on the premium, is gauged by 
areas C and D . As area C is greater than area D , this implies that there must be an 
overall increase in the premium. This result is depicted in Figure 4(a) as the difference 
between q and 41. 
The increase in the premium results in a positive wealth effect due to the increased 
domestic currency price of foreign asset holdings. This wealth effect leads to dissaving and 
hence a trade account deficit. Furthermore, this deficit is aggravated by the decline in real 
money balances. This exercise is of interest because it suggests that any disturbance that 
leads to an increased trade deficit will provoke an increase in the premium (i.e. increase the 
diff eren ti al). 
Lizondo's (1987a) discussion of increased public expenditures generates results consistent 
with those of Dornbusch above, although his model differs somewhat to that of Dornbusch. 
In his model Lizondo assumes all goods are traded goods. Thus, an increase of Lig in 
public sector expenditure only means Lig of additional imports through the official 
market. This has the effect of worsening the balance of payments. If however, this model 
is modified to account for non-traded goods, the increase in public expenditure will 
increase the steady-state real stock of money which will (a) increase the differential 
between exchange rates so as to maintain portfolio equilibrium and (b) increase the 
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inflation tax, thus improving the balance of payments indirectly. This improvement will 
offset part of the deficit. Thus, an increase of ~g in public sector expenditure that falls 
at least partially in non-traded goods increases the steady state differential and worsens 
the balance of payments by less that ~g. 32 
2.6.4 Evasion of Capital Controls 33 
Due to incomplete market separation, it has become more difficult for the monetary 
authorities to insulate the official rate from speculative disturbances. As seen earlier, a 
neutral intervention policy does allow the authorities a certain degree of control in 
defending the official exchange rate against heavy, speculative movements. However, in 
the case of outright evasion, the neutral intervention policy may not entirely offset the 
effect on the financial exchange rate of shifts of transactions between the two markets. The 
reason for this is that evasion may establish an implicit financial exchange rate which 
changes the net demand for foreign exchange on the financial market at the prevailing 
market rate. It is argued that evasion of capital controls tends to unify the two exchange 
rates. Whether the financial and official rates will merge completely depends however on 
the cost of the evasion. These costs include the official penalties (adjusted for the risk of 
being caught) and administrative costs for the evader. This cost of evasion, however, will 
not ensure that the rates in the two markets are kept apart, although it remains a factor 
tending to keep them apart. 
32 
33 
Balance of payments is defined as: the public sector surplus or deficit plus inflation 
tax. 
The discussion of evasion draws on the work of Fleming (1971), Lanyi (1975), Gros 
(1988). 
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Gros (1988) argues that the differential between the two rates of exchange would tend to 
disappear over time. If private arbitrage activity is accounted for, dual exchange rates can 
succeed only temporarily in dampening the effects on the domestic goods market of shocks 
to financial or other markets. Gros does however concede that a small positive exchange 
rate differential might be compatable with no arbitrage flows due to equivalent marginal 
costs of arbitrage flows. 34 
The mechanism for evasion may be described as follows: If a differential between the 
financial and official rates exists, individuals have an incentive to send funds out of the 
domestic country at the higher rate and bring these same funds back at the lower rate, 
hence realizing a profit in domestic currency. This round-tripping has the effect of 
unifying the rates. If the financial exchange rate was quoted at a discount to the official 
rate, the outflow of reserves at the higher official rate would put downward pressure on the 
rate, while the increased inflow of capital at the financial rate would tend to appreciate this 
rate. However, there may be limited incentives for round-tripping in the sense that 
individuals would rather not bring back capital at the financial rate, but rather purchase 
assets abroad. There would thus be downward pressure on the official rate while there 
would be no upward pressure on the financial rate. If it is the monetary authorities 
intention to maintain a pegged official rate, there would be no effect on the differential 
between rates. 
It would not be possible, however, to maintain this pegged rate indefinitely, as the 
authorities would soon run out of international reserves. If a neutral intervention policy 
was pursued in an attempt to maintain the level of international reserves, successive 
depreciations in the financial rate would be necessary to effect an inflow of foreign 
exchange. This would increase the differential between rates increasing the incentive for 
evasion, as well as giving rise to the "reverse transfer problem" discussed above. 
34 A similar result is obtained by Lanyi (1975). 
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If we assume that the financial rate is at a premium to the official rate, non-residents will 
be induced to seek ways of bringing money into the home country at the official rate, while 
residents will have an incentive to make import payments at the financial rate. Residents 
thus have an incentive to under-invoice imports, the difference being made up by a 
separate transaction through the financial exchange market. This transaction can take the 
form of the importer purchasing a foreign asset, reselling it abroad, and using the proceeds 
to pay the foreign exporter. 
The effect of under-invoicing imports is to reduce the price of imports and increase 
domestic demand for imports in the home country. This increased demand will decrease 
the trade surplus or increase the trade deficit. If the monetary authorities intervene in the 
financial exchange market by purchasing foreign exchange to restore BOP's equilibrium, 
the financial rate will depreciate (i.e. premium decreases) tending to unify the rates. 35 
If, on the other hand, the financial rate is at a discount, residents have an incentive to 
under-invoice exports. Thus, if the official and financial rates are quoted at 50 USc/1 
Rand and 25 USc/1 Rand respectively, total exports of R2000 should generate $1000 at the 
official rate. However, exporters will invoice exports of RlOOO only, generating $500 at the 
official rate. The difference enters the home country as a capital investment at the 
financial rate. Therefore, $500 enters the home country converted at the financial rate to 
R2000. The net gain to the exporter·is thus RlOOO. 
This under-invoicing of exports will put downward pressure on the price, increasing the 
foreign demand for exports. The net effect on this would be to generate a surplus on the 
trade account. Through intervention in the financial exchange market, the · authorities 
would sell foreign exchange in the financial market appreciating the financial rate. 
35 See Lanyi, Appendix II. 
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illegal arbitrage between the two markets is another type of evasion. For example a 
multi-national corporation sends funds out of the country at the financial rate ( quoted at a 
premium), and brings these funds back at the official rate under the guise of additional 
royalty payments. Assuming that the multi-national corporation sends $600,00 (RlOOO) 
out at the financial rate and then brings these same funds back at the official rate (R1200), 
the net gain in domestic currency is R200. In this case $600 left at the financial rate and 
$600 entered at the official rate. If the monetary authorities resell the $600 that entered at 
the ~fficial rate, in the financial market, the net change in foreign exchange is zero. 
Therefore, the financial rate is unchanged. The only effect on the financial rate will be in 
the very short term. 
2.7 SYSTEM SWITCHING - FROM TWO-TIER TO UNIFICATION 
The following discussion examines the effect of switching from a dual exchange system to a 
flexible or crawling peg system. Lizondo ( 1987b) argues that the balance of payments relief 
offered by the adoption of dual systems has frequently been only transitory. Countries that 
failed to curb excessively expansionary policies were again confronted with balance of 
payments deficits in the official market and in large depreciations of the domestic currency 
in the free market. The question of whether the adoption of a unified flexible rate regime 
results in a sharp depreciation of the official rate or whether the adoption of a pegged rate 
regime results in large balance of payments deficits, is addressed. 
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Lizondo's portfolio-balance model includes commercial transactions in both the official and 
free markets i.e. certain essential exports and imports are conducted at the official rate 
while all remaining exports and imports are conducted at the free rate. Assumptions of the 
model include: 
(a) All goods are traded goods and tot·al output is constant. 
(b) No domestic expenditure on domestically produced goods occur i.e. Total output is 
exported while total consumption is imported. 
( c) The private sector allocates its wealth between domestic and foreign money. 
The balance of payments is defined as the difference in inflation tax, 7rIIl ( where 1r is the 
rate of depreciation of the official exchange rate, and m is the real stock of money), and 
-
the public sector deficit in real terms, µm ( where µ is the rate of credit creation). Thus, 
if µ > 1r i.e. the rate of growth in credit expansion exceeds that of the rate of depreciation 
of the official exchange rate, the balance of payments moves into deficit and cannot be 
sustained indefinitely. Furthermore, under a dual exchange system, the rate of inflation is 
determined by the rate of depreciation of the official exchange rate, with any excess in 
domestic credit creation being reflected in a balance of payments deficit rather than in 
additional inflation. Under a floating system on the other hand, the full amount of 
domestic credit creation is reflected in the rate of inflation because the central bank no 
longer offsets part of the additional domestic credit by selling foreign exchange. 36 
We now consider the case of a country under the dual system that has a balance of 
payments deficit (µ > 1r) and a free exchange rate that is quoted at a discount to the 
official rate (i.e. the differential exceeds 1 as the exchange rate is defined as domestic 
currency vs. foreign currency). 
36 In the case of a crawling peg syste~, the rate of inflation is also determined by the 
rate of domestic credit creation, µ . Now, since µ > 1r, the rate of inflation is 
greater under unified rates than under a dual system. 
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2.1.1 Unification - The case of the flexible exchange rate 
system 
The diagram below presents the unification of exchange markets under a floating exchange 
rate system. Assuming an initial stationary equilibrium under a dual system at point B, 
the adoption of a flexible rate regime determines the point of equilibrium, at the time of . 
unification, at point C, with a real stock of domestic money equal to {M/x)o. From point 
C, the economy adjusts along TT toward steady-state equilibrium, E . Since {M/s)o < 
(M/x) 0 < (M/e) 0 this implies that e < x: < s i.e. the floating exchange rate depreciates 
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stationary equilibrium under a dual system 
the stock of foreign money is pre-determined under a floating system 
along the TT-schedule. 
combinations of F and m that are consistent with equilibrium in 
the current account. 
indicates the combinations of m and F that imply a rate of 
depreciation of the unified rate, x , equal to the rate of growth of the 
nominal stock of domestic money, µ. 
corresponds to the real stock of money when, µ > 1r . 
corresponds to the real stock of domestic money under a dual system 
where e and s, are the official and financial exchange rates 
respectively. 
real stock of domestic money under a flexible system where x is the 
flexible exchange rate. 
The initial depreciation of x with respect to e , is equal to the ratio of the real stock of 
domestic money under the dual system, m = (M/e) 0 , over the real stock of domestic 
money under the floating system at the time of unification, (M/x) 0 • Thus, the magnitude 
of the depreciation of the floating exchange rate will be greater, the greater is the share of 
imports in the free market; the lower i_s the share of exports in the free market; the fower is 
the rate of depreciation of the official rate; and the higher is the rate of domestic credit 
creation. In terms of the portfolio-balance rule, these factors imply a higher real stock of 
domestic money under the dual system . . 
From the diagram above, an increase in imports; a decline in exports; or a decline in the 
rate of depreciation of the official rate ( 1r) , shifts point B downwards and to the right. A 
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decline in 1r in addition rotates (M/s) clockwise, while an increase in the rate of credit 
creation, µ, , shifts B horizontally to the right, and rotates the ril = O curve 
counter-clockwise, thus shifting TT to the left. The higher real stock of domestic money 
under the dual system implies a lower real stock of domestic money under a flexible rate 
regime at the time of unification. A similar type of argument can be applied for the initial 
appreciation of the floating rate with respect to the free rate of the dual system. 37 
2.1.2 Unification - The case of the crawling peg system 
The diagram below is used to explain the dynamics of a unified crawling peg system. In 
order for the crawling peg system to be sustainable in the long run, the rate of crawl ( 6') 
should be higher than, or equal to, the rate of domestic credit creation (µ,) . If balance of 
payments equilibrium is the long run objective under a crawling peg system, it is assumed 
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Please note that the floating rate may depreciate with respect to the free rate at the 
time of unification. 
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Where: 
P Combinations of F and m consistent with portfolio equilibrium 
under a crawling-pe.g system. 
(M/s) - portfolio equilibrium under a dual system . 
. 
m=O- combinations of F and m consistent with a constant real stock of 
domestic money ( i = µ). 
It is . assumed, firstly, that at the time of unification no maxi-devaluation of the exchange 
rate occurs. Thus, the pegged rate, c , is equal to the official rate (e) . under the dual 
system. Once the markets are unified, the economy is out of portfolio equilibrium at point 
B , requiring a private sector shift out of domestic money and into foreign money. This 
portfolio shift results in a move from B to D . The increase in· private sector holdings of 
foreign money is matched by a decline in the international reserves of the central bank. 
Thus the effect is a deficit in the balance of payments due to the capital outflow. 38 The 
steady-state equilibrium is achieved by the movement from D to E along P . During 
the adjustment the balance of payments is in deficit, resulting from a current account 
deficit that is only partially offset by the capital account surplus. At E , the balance of 
payments is in equilibrium. 
It is now assumed that a maxi-devaluation of the pegged rate occurs at the time of 
unification. Starting from point B, a maxi-devaluation moves the economy to point G 
where the initial capital outflows will be eliminated. This maxi-devaluation has the effect 
of reducing the real stock of domestic money as well as initial real wealth. This fall in real 
wealth then implies a lower deficit ( or higher surplus) than otherwise in the current 
account during the process of adjustment towards the steady state. 
38 The magnitude of the outflow depends on the initial holdings of domestic money 
and foreign money as well as the rate of depreciation when switching to the unified 
system. 
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In order to completely eliminate the initial capital outflow, the magnitude of the ma:xi-
devaluation is shown to exceed the differential between the free and official rates of the 
dual system (see Figure 6). If the pegged rate was initially set equal to the free rate (point 
I), there would be a further move from point I to J due to the reallocation of the private 
sector portfolio. 39 There would be a capital outflow resulting from the higher than desired 
ratio of foreign to domestic money. Furthermore, any devaluation beyond point G would 
result in a capital inflow, adjustment once again occurring along the P-schedule. 
The effect of the devaluation on the domestic economy is an inflationary one, as the unified 
rate depreciates inflation is imported. If consumers substitute towards domestic goods this 
will put upward pressure on those prices facilitating the inflationary trend. 
In summing up, it has been shown that if a two-tier system is replaced by a flexible 
exchange rate system, the unified exchange rate depreciates to a level either above or below 
the free rate of exchange. The magnitude of this depreciation depends on the share of 
. 
imports and exports in the free market as well as the rate of depreciation of the official 
exchange rate and rate of domestic credit creation. 
In the second case of the adoption of a crawling peg system, it has been shown that the 
unified exchange rate tends to depreciate to a level below the free rate. This is necessary in 
order to preven,t a capital outflow due to a reallocation of the private sector portfolio. 
39 The desired ratio of foreign money to domestic money is higher under a crawling-
peg system (given by P) than under a dual system (given by {M/s) , due to the 
higher rate of depreciation under the crawling-peg system l G > 1r). 
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2.8 SUMMARY 
The literature on dual market systems assumes implicitly that complete market separation 
and a neutral intervention policy are essential for the effective implementation of a 
two-tier system. However, since complete market seperation does not occur in reality, the 
dual market system becomes less effective in protecting the official reserves against 
speculative disturbances. 
The rationale behind the neutral intervention policy is that it ensures overall balance of 
payments equilibrium and a stable official rate of exchange. Such a policy will only be 
adopted if the objective of the monetary authorities is to maintain a fixed official rate of 
exchange. A neutral intervention policy is however not pursued in practise, making it 
difficult for the monetary authorities to peg the official rate due to the resultant changes 
in official reserves. 
On the effectiveness of monetary policy under a dual market system, the literature appears 
diyided. Barattieri and Ragazzi argue that monetary policy is effective in sustaining a 
given level of income in both the short and long run. However, Gros argues that in fact an 
expansionary monetary policy will only maintain a certain level of income in the short run. 
There is consensus however on the ability of monetary policy to effect the domestic price 
level in the short run. A further implication of dual market systems is that the monetary 
authorities have greater independence from external constraints than they would normally 
enjoy under a unified exchange regime. 
Allied to this is the insulation capabilities of dual exchange rate systems against foreign 
shocks viz: interest rate shocks and foreign price shocks. 
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Marion argues that if investors hold foreign consols within their portfolios, a foreign 
interest rate shock will have no effect on the domestic economy. However, in the case of 
foreign bonds of short term maturity, the two-tier system is unable to insulate the 
domestic economy. Gros however argues that insulation is possible although it would only 
be temporary. Furthermore, if an expansionary monetary policy is used to maintain 
domestic interest rates below foreign interest rates, the two-tier system will dampen the 
effects of the shock only temporarily. 
The issue of political risk and deviations from interest rate parity is incorporated into the 
framework of foreign shocks. Phylaktis found that for Argentina about one third of the 
variation between interest rates could be attributed to political risk. 
In the case of foreign price shocks on the domestic economy ( especially domestic prices), 
Marion argues that the two-tier system, in the absence of monetary policy, is unable to 
insult ate domestic prices against the foreign shock. However, in the presence of monetary 
intervention, the two-tier system is seen to allow a certain degree of insulation against 
importe~ inflation, although its power to do so is limited. 
The effect of domestic shocks on the exchange rate differential and balance of payments is 
also discussed. In the case of an unexpected devaluation of the commercial rate, the 
steady-state differential as well as the balance of payments is unaffected. If the 
devaluation is expected, however, the financial rate discount widens. An expected increase 
in government spending is seen to increase the differential between rates ( financial rate 
depreciates) and worsen the trade account. Finally, the evasion of capital controls and its 
impact on the exchange rate differential is considered. It is argued that these shocks tend 
to unify the official and financial rates of exchange, as well as affect the balance of 
payments. 
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Finally, the magnitude of depreciations due to the replacement of the dual system by a 
unified floating - or crawling peg system - is considered. The implications of this 
depreciation on the domestic price level is also briefly dealt with. 
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SECTION 3 
3.1 THE FINANCIAL RAND MECHANISM IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The South African financial rand market differs in many respects to those markets 
discussed above in Section 2. The most fundamental difference is that those mode\s assume 
perfect capital mobility, an assumption clearly at odds with the South African scenario. 
The financial rand market is characterized by stringent exchange controis, on flows in and 
out of the market, on residents and to a lesser extent on non-residents. 
There is thus an asymmetry in the financial rand market with non-residents investing 
domestically at the financial rate while residents are unable to invest abroad at the 
financial rate. The obvious exceptions involve emmigrants who are allowed to transfer a 
specified amount of capital abroad at the financial rate. 
Furthermore, in South Africa, certain capital account transactions are not affected at the 
financial rand rate. Loans and trade credits while capital account transactions, are affected 
at the commercial rand rate of exchange. 
Exchange controls on residents thus make the South African dual exchange market 
different to those discussed in the literature. The section below provides a brief historical 
overview to their emergence. 
3.1.1 Historical Overview 
In June 1961 after the Sharpeville uprising, South Africa introduced the "blocked rand" 
mechanism. This measure restricted the repatriation of funds previously invested in South 
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Africa by foreigners. Thus the sale of local securities on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE) resulted in funds being deposited at commercial banks in "blocked rand" accounts, 
repatriation of which was allowed only under certain circumstances. It was not possible, 
for example, to convert "blocked rand" balances directly to foreign currency nor to transfer 
"blocked rand" from one non-resident account to another. 
The "gilt-wash" was however employed to allow foreigners to transfer "blocked rand" from 
one account to another and hence repatriate funds abroad. The mechanism is described as 
follows: "blocked rand" in one account could be used to purchase local securities. The 
subsequent sale of these securities to another non-resident for another currency, say 
dollars, was permitted. This non-resident could then purchase local securities resulting 
from the creation of a new "blocked rand" account. The resulting "blocked rand" rate 
nearly always stood at a discount to the commercial rate. This meant that foreign 
investors, in repatriating funds from South Africa through the share market (buy shares in 
South Africa and sell them in London or New York), were consistently obliged to accept a 
loss equivalent to the differential between the two rates. 
In February 1976, new exchange control regulations came into effect distinguishing between 
"blocked rand" and "securities rand". The local sale and redemption proceeds of South 
African securities and other investments in South Africa, owned by non-residents, were 
designated "securities rand" balances in commercial banks. Transfer of "securities rand" 
balances between non-residents could occur freely. This deemed the "gilt-wash" as no 
longer necessary. The funds of emmigrants on the other hand, which were blocked in South 
Africa, continued to be referred to as "blocked rand". 
In January 1979, the securities rand market was renamed the financial rand market, its 
scope being broadened to incorporate the'·i>urchase of a proprietor's interest in a business in 
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South Africa subject to Reserve Bank approval. In 1983 the dual exchange rate system was 
abolished but re-introduced in September 1985 in the wake of the debt crisis. 
3.1.2 The Parallel Markets in Financial Rands 
3.1.2.1 The Securities Market 
The financial rand market incorporates a "pool" of investment currency which is traded in 
by foreign investors. Financial rands may thus be "created" or "destroyed" in this market. 
If a non-resident buys shares in London or New York and sells them on the JSE to a South 
African, he receives financial rands which are then said to be "created" . 40 Alternatively, 
the simultaneous purchase of shares in South Africa and sale in London "destroys" financial 
rands. The effect of these actions on the financial rate of exchange can be shown by 
considering the following expression where the financial rate is defined purely as a result of 
the differential between share prices in Johannesburg and the prices of the same shares 
quoted in London or New York : 
FR -
41 securities in 
secunties m 
Thus, if a foreign investor purchases S.A. shares in London and sells these same S.A. shares 
in South Africa, the financial rate will rise (appreciate). This occurs due to the upward 
pressure on share prices in London and the downward pressure on share prices on the JSE. 
Alternatively, the purchase of S.A. shares in London and sale in South Africa may be 
viewed as an increase in the demand for financial rands, the effect of this increas~d demand 
40 
41 
The same applies if he sells property, unlisted shares or fixed interest securities in 
South Africa. 
FR= financial rate quoted in US dollars. 
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( which leads to the creation of financial rands) being reflected as an increase in the 
financial rate. On the other hand, the simultaneous purchase of shares on the JSE and sale 
of S.A. shares in London, depreciates the financial rate. 
Since foreign investors buy shares at ~he financial rate and receive dividends at the 
commercial rate, the dividend yield received by foreigners increases by the premium of the 
commercial - over the financial rate. Thus, assuming a financial rate of 25 USc and a 
coml!lercial rate of 50 USc, it can be shown that the dividend yield to foreigners is double 
the yield to local investors. 
If a foreign investor invests $25 000 in S.A. shares with a yield of 5%, the all-in yield is : 
$25 000 invested via the FR = RlOO 000 
Yield@ 5% R 5 000 
Less 15% non-residents tax - R 4 250 
Converted @ commercial rate - $ 2 125 
All-in-yield= $2125/$25 000 - 8.5% 
Notice however that in the absence of non-resident's tax, the all-in yield is 10% (double 
the 5% received by local investors). 
3.1.2.2 The Cash Market 
A parallel market in financial rands has developed steadily since September 1985. This 
cash market involves the actual purchase or sale of financial rands by foreigners and is 
made up by a few local banks, with The Standard Bank of South Africa Limited, French 
Bank of Southern Africa Limited and UAL Merchant Bank Limited among the most active. 
The important difference between this market and the one discussed above (securities 
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market), is that financial rands are not "created" or "destroyed" through the securities 
market. Rather, financial rands may be "created" or "destroyed" through the cash market 
as a result of, say, disinvestment by multi-national companies (MNC) with South African 
subsidiaries. The sale of Barclays plc of its South African interests resulted in the creation 
of financial rand balances, these funds being converted into foreign exchange through the 
cash market and not via the purchase of shares in Johannesburg and sale in London. The 
selling of financial rand balances in the cash market has the effect of depreciating the 
financial rate (due to the increase in supply) a result no different to that had the MNC 
purchased shares in Johannesburg and sold these same shares in London. 
As as result of the emergence of the cash market in financial rands, the financial rand 
system has come to resemble more closely an actual exchange rate. 
3.1.3 Arbitrage and Position Taking 
Arbitrage ensures that the financial rand rate quoted in the cash market equals the ratio of 
the $-price of S.A. shares in London to the rand price on the JSE. 
Assume initially that the arbitrageur is !3-ble to buy financial rands at $0.30 in the cash 
market. If the ruling price of De Beers is R60 on the JSE and $15 in London, the 
arbitrageur may obtain his financial rands at $15/R60 = $0.2500. 
Since it is cheaper to buy financial rands in the securities market, our arbitrageur will buy 
De Beers at $15 in London and sell De Beers at R60 on the JSE. The proceeds, from the 
sale of De Beers on the JSE, is designated financial rands. The arbitrageur now stands to 
make a profit by selling these financial rands in the cash market receiving more dollars 
than he initially paid out. 
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The effect of this arbitrage activity is to put upward pressure on the financial rate in the 
securities market while putting downward pressure on the financial rate in the cash market. 
Arbitrage will continue until the two rates are equalized. 
The upward pressure on the financial rate in the securities market comes about due to the 
fall in the price of De Beers on the JSE (arbitrageurs sell De Beers) and the rise in the · 
$-price of De Beers in London (arbitrageurs buy De Beers). 
Similarly, the increased supply of financial rands to the cash market (arbitrageurs sell 
financial rands) puts downward pressure on its price. 
In practice, arbitrage is limited by a 0.5 US cent spread between buying and selling quotes 
for financial rands. The ratio between Johannesburg and London prices of any particular 
share generally lie within the buying and selling range. If a share lies outside of this range, 
arbitrage becomes worthwhile. 
3.1.4 Foreign vs. Local Sentiment 
Foreign and local investors tend to have different perceptions of the political risk in South 
Africa primarily as a result of different information available to each separate group. An 
unrest related incident reported in the foreign media may cause foreigners to react 
negatively while local investors may not react at all since they are accustomed to reading 
about unrest related inciden_ts in the local press. 
In the absence of the financial rand mechanism, the domestic stock market would be more 
volatile due to this asymmetry in perceptions. For this reason, the incorporation -of the 
financial rand mechanism cushions the domestic stock market from negative foreign 
perceptions. 
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Consider what effect an unrest related incident reported in the foreign media may have on 
the domestic stock market. 
Foreign investors may attempt to disinvest through the securities market by buying S.A. 
shares in Johannesburg and simultaneously selling S.A. shares in London. The effect of 
this is to push up share prices on the JSE while share prices in London fall resulting in a 
depreciation in the financial rand. Thus, if foreigners disinvest from South Africa, local 
share prices generally tend to rise. 
If on the other hand foreigners attempt to disinvest directly through the cash market, there 
would be an excess supply of financial rands pushing down the financial rate. 
Arbitrageurs would take advantage of this lower rate by buying shares in Johannesburg 
simultaneously selling shares in London. The effect of this is to put upward pressure on 
domestic share prices. 
In eithe! case, if disinvestment occurs via the securities market or the cash market, the 
financial rand discount widens and domestic share prices tend to rise. 
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SECTION 4 
4.1 INSULATION PROPERTIES OF THE DUAL EXCHANGE MECHANISM 
4.1.1 Foreign Interest Rate Shocks 
In the discussion of Section 2, Marion (1981) argued that the two-tier exchange system 
was ·unable to insulate the domestic economy against foreign interest rate shocks. An 
important assumption of this model is that domestic investors hold foreign bonds of short 
term maturity in their portfolios. In the South African context however, exchange controls 
prohibit the inclusion of foreign assets in domestic portfolios. 
While Marion's results differ somewhat from those of Gros, it is important to realize that 
the temporary insulation effect Gros refers to is in large part a function of the premise that 
the steady state differential between the official and financial markets is zero. In South 
Africa, the steady state differential has not been zero. The inference drawn from this is · 
that what Gros refers to as temporary insulation may well be long term insulation in South 
Africa. 
The purpose of the present discussion is to establish whether or not the dual market system 
in South Africa has insulation properties. 
4.1.1.1 Methodology 






1980 to January 1983 - is characterized by the existence of a 
dual exchange rate system. 
February 1983 to August 1985 - saw the abolition of the 
two-tier system, this being replaced by a unified rate of 
exchange and a managed float. 
September 1985 to the present witnessed the 
re-introduction of the dual exchange rate mechanism. 
Two versions of the interest-parity condition were tested over these three distinct periods. 
The first of these is the interest-parity condition for a dual exchange regime42 while the 
second is the interest-parity expression for a unified exchange regime. 43 Each is 
presented below : 
Dual Exchange Regime : 
. '* FR FR - FRe lOO 1 - 1 CRe = FR . Equation 11 
By definition of interest-parity, the difference between the domestic and effective foreign 
interest rates is equal to the expected depreciation or appreciation of the financial rand. 
Since no market in forward financial rands exists, we cannot test equation 11 in quite the 
same way. Following Levich (1985) the regression equation below, derived from the 
interest-parity condition was tested. 
. {3 '* {3 FR 1 = a + 11 + 2 CRe . Equation ll(a) 
42 See Equation 5, Section 2. 
43 See Equation 4, Section 2. 
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Hypothesis 1 : 
The null hypothesis to be tested is 
Ho: fl1 = 0. 
From Equation 11( a), if fl1 = 0 , this indicates that domestic interest rates are insulated 
against foreign interest rate shocks. 
The second expression tested is : 
Unified Exchange Regime: 
. "* CR - CRe . 100 
1-1 = CR Equation 12 
Clearly, if domestic interest rates stand at a premium to foreign interest rates, the forward 
commercial rate of exchange is expected to depreciate. 
The validity of Equation 12 was tested in the form of the following regression equation. 44 
. fl.* fl CR - CRe 
1 = a + 11 + 2 CR . Equation 12(a) . 
Theory would expect the value of the coefficient of foreign interest rates, fl1 , to be very 
close to 1 . That is, holding the expected change in the commercial rate constant, an 
increase in foreign interest rates would be expected to lead to a proportionate increase in 
domestic interest rates. 
44 CRe = CR x (((tfus - tfsa)/400) + 1) 
Where: tfus - 90 day US Trade finance rate 
tfsa - 90 day SA trade finance rate 
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Hypothesis 2 : 
The above discussion on unified exchange rates necessitates the testing of the following null 
hypothesis : 
Ho: fJ1 = 1 . 
4.1.1.2 Findings 
The results from the two respective interest-parity regressions (Equations ll(a) and 12(a)) 
are presented in Tables 1 to 3 on pages 63 to 64. 
4.1.1.2.1 Interest-Parity Under a. Dual Exchange Regime: 
Considering firstly period 1 (January 1980 to January 1983) it was found that the 
coefficient for foreign interest rates approximated zero. The students t-test was used to 
establish at what level of significance the null hypothesis could be accepted (see Table 1). 
Since t~ falls within the acceptance region, we accept at a 95% level of significance the 
null hypothesis (hypothesis 1) that {31 = 0 . This result supports the hypothesis that the 
dual exchange rate mechanism does exhibit insulation properties against foreign interest 
rate shocks. 
Similarly, from Table 3, the same result can be found for period III (September 1985 to 
December 1988) when the financial rand ~as re-introduced. 
However, in this later period, the coefficient of the foreign interest rate was significantly 
different to that found in period I (0.2847954 vs. 0.0503974). In order to establish 
whether or not this discrepency could be -attributed to statistical error or differences in the 
estimated functions themselves, the chow test was performed. 
M 
(0 
PERIOD I 1980.01 - 1983.01 EQUATION . f3 '* f3 FR 1 =a+ 11 + 2~-
CRe 
·* f31 f32 
CONFIDENCE 2 ACCEPT /REJECT . 
i , 1 a R INTERVAL Ho: f31 = 0 
tfsa, tfus 7.2599985 0.0503974 9.4828456 95% 0.966676 Accept f31 = 0 
(1.1551690) (0.6183124) (1. 7537776) 
BASA90, USBA90 6.3749736 0.0990370 10.764547 95% 0.972949 Accept f31 = 0 
(1. 02649) (1.2104093) (2.2247839) 
INSULATION PROPERTIES OF TWO-TIER EXCHANGE SYSTEMS 
PERIOD I I 1983.01 - 1985.08 
. . * 1 , 1 a f31 
tfsa, tfus 2.2213668 0.8889481 
(0.895633) (-0. 846031) 
BASA90, USBA90 2.0758203 0.8827359 
-
(0.7268152) (-0. 7796405) 
TABLE 
EQUATION i a+ f31i* + f3 CR - CRe 2 CR 
f32 
CONFIDENCE R2 ACCEPT/REJECT 
INTERVAL Ho: f31 = 1 
0.8951605 95% 0.966853 Accept 13 1 = 1 
( -2. 4 7 46 72 5) 
0.9041011 95% 0.949042 Accept 13 1 = 1 
(-2.1524292) 












. . * 1. , 1. 
tfsa, tfus 
BASA90, USBA90 






1985.09 - 1988.12 
S1 S2 
0.2847953 3. 6775612 
(1.1422149) ( 1. 8536946) 
0.2915082 4.0146915 






i =a+ S1i* + S2 FR 
CRe 
R2 ACCEPT/REJECT 
Ho: S1 = 0 
0.941471 Accept S1 = 0 
0.950574 Accept S1 = 0 







The results of this test are shown in Appendix B. The hypothesis tested was 
Iio: b1 = /31 
where b1 represents the coefficient of the foreign interest rate in period I, while {31 
represents the coefficient in period III. The null hypothesis above was rejected verifying 
the existance of some unexplained factor making the two functions different. Thus, even 
though the same model explains the behaviour of the dual exchange rate over the two 
respective periods, the two periods are statistically different. 
4.1.1.2.2 Interest-Parity Under a Unified Exchange Regime: 
For period II {February 1983 to August 1985) the value of the coefficient for foreign 
interest __rates approximated unity. This result accords with the expectation that under a 
unified exchange regime, ceteris paribus, an increase in foreign interest rates would be 
expected to lead to a proportionate increase in domestic interest rates. 
The students t-test was once again used to establish the level of significance at which the 
null hypothesis {hypothesis 2) could be accepted (see Table 2). 
Since -2.032 < t* < 2.032 , the null hypothesis is accepted at the 95% level of confidence. 
4.1.2 Risk and the Domestic Economy Under Dual 
Exchange Rates 
The interest-parity regression equation, Equation ll{a), is reproduced below : 
. /3 .* {3 FR 
I = a + 11 + 2 'CRe · Equation ll{a) 
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Since /31i* tends to zero, domestic interest rates are shown to be determined by the factor, 
b~e . Hence removing /31i* from Equation ll(a) the relationship between domestic rates 
FR and the factor, CRe , was tested. 
. . /3 FR 1=a+ 2CJre· Equation ll(b) 
The result of this regression is given belo~ in Table 4 for both periods I and III. 
PERIOD I : 1980.01 1983.01 
Constant Coefficient 
a /32 
10.091605 8. 7884421 
( 1. 084 7034) (1.6638255) 
Correlation R 2 Durbin -
Watson 
0.6979317 0.966928 1.050099 




















In both period I and III, the results are significant at 90% and 95% levels respectively. 
Furthermore, the correlation between i and b~e is high at % 70% over both periods. 
This result suggests that the pattern of domestic interest rates is affected by the financial 
rand discount and not by foreign interest rates. 
Before the relationship between risk and domestic interest rates can be established, a 
suitable measure of risk must be constructed. The measure used is the deviation from 
interest rate parity under a dual exchange regime. This measure of risk is similar to that 
used by Dooley and Isard (1980) and Phylaktis (1988). 
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Risk is therefore given as : 
Risk= [i -t 6~e] - [FR FRFRe * 100] 
where i 90 day SA Trade finance rate 
* i 90 day US Trade finance rate 
CRe expected commercial rand rate 
FR financial rand rate 
FRe expected financial rand rate 
Since no forward market in financial rands exists, FRe is calculated as follows : 45 
FRe = FR (1-[i * (~) -t]) 
Figure 7(a) shows the deviation from interest rate parity. Furthermore, the figure shows 
the relationship between the financial rand discount and the measure of risk. Hence, as 
risk increases, the financial rand differential widens. 
After the debt standstill declared in September 1985, the financial rand mechanism was 
re-introduced to prevent capital flight. However, in spite of the increase in perceived risk 
(due to the debt morotorium) domestic interest rates fell while the financial rand adjusted 
return increased. 
In terms of Equation 13 below, an increase in risk (R) requires an increase in the- return 
to foreigners holding South African assets (µ) . Now in order for this to happen, given 
that domestic rates are falling, the financial rand discount (~) would have to widen at 
a faster rate than the fall in domestic interest rates (i) . 
45 A similar measure is used by Nurick (1982). 
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Utilizing a notational framework, risk is shown to have the following effect : 
Equation 13 
l R ~ l µ only . d CRe d . If at (FI[") > at (1). 
Figure 7(b) confirms this result. Taking log changes in the domestic interest rate and 
financial rand discount, it is seen that the rate of change in the financial rand discount 
exceeded that of interest rates for most o~ the period 1985 to 1988. 
Referring to Figure 7( c) it can be seen that over the 1983 to 1985 period (period II) when 
the financial rand mechanism was abolished, there was no longer any differential between 
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In figure 7( c), the small variability between the SA trade finance rate and financial 
rand adjusted trade finance rate over the 1983 to 1985 period is attributed to the 
monthly average commercial rand rate used. 
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Rates of Change : Financial Rand Discount and 
Domestic Interest Rates 
FIGURE 7(b) 
1988 
In the absence then of the financial rand mechanism any increase in risk would havE: had to 
be compensated through higher nominal interest rates. (See Appendix C) This suggests 
that over the 1983-1985 period, the domestic economy had to bear the brunt of perceived 
risk through higher domestic interest rates. Admittedly, the monetary authorities raised 
interest rates over this period in an effort to curb money supply growth and hence inflation 
as well as to protect the balance of payments. However, had the financial rand mechanism 
not been abolished these increases in domestic interest rates could well have been lower 
than they actually were. It can thus be argued that the recession of 1984-1985 was in part 
self-induced due to the scrapping of the dual exchange rate mechanism. 
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One further point that lends credibility to this argument can be made by comparing the 
peaks of domestic as well as financial rand-adjusted interest rates. In Figure 7( c) it is 
shown that domestic interest rates peaked in 1984. However, this peak is only slightly 
higher than the financial rand adjusted peaks in 1986. This tends to suggest that domestic 
interest rates could well have been at lower levels over the 1984-1985 period. 
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From Equation 13 above, an increase in risk requires a depreciation in the financial rate 
raising the financial rand adjusted return on South African assets ( assuming that the 
expected commercial rate remains constant). 
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In terms of the simplified equation, 
. a FR 
1 =a+ JJ2 CRe Equation ll(b) 
a depreciation in the financial rate ( assuming risk is constant) allows the monetary 
authorities autonomy in setting interest rates lower. 
However, if risk increases this would normally require a rise in domestic interest rates to 
compensate foreigners for their negative view of political and economic developments in 
South Africa. Since the financial rand discount widens in response to this increased risk, 
the domestic interest rate can remain unchanged while the financial rand adjusted return 
to foreigners increases. Therefore, the financial rand mechanism tends to insulate domestic 
interest rates in response to increased risk. 
The identity below shows this adjustment :47 
' TCRe i µ=1~. 
In the section that follows we consider what effect risk has on the equity market and 
whether the two-tier system is able to cushion the stock market from increased risk. 
47 Note that this identity is similar to the temporary insulation identity Gros refer to. 
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Domestic Interest Rates vs. Financial Rand Discount 
FIGURE 8 
4.1.3 Risk and the Equity Market 
Using identity 1 (see Section 3), the adjustment of the equity market to increased 
perceptions of risk, is discussed. 
Identity 1: New York 
In terms of this identity, a depreciation in the financial rand rate ( due to increased risk) 
would tend to raise the value of equities on the JSE, ~nsulating the domestic stock market. 
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The rationale is simply this: If foreigners holding financial rand balances at commercial 
banks take a negative view of political and economic developments in South Africa, they 
will attempt to get rid of these balances. They are able to do so in one of two ways. 
Firstly, they may buy S.A. shares on the JSE and simultaneously sell these same shares in 
London. In terms of our identity above, the prices of shares on the JSE are bid up whilst 
I 
those in London are bid down. The net result is a depreciation in the financial rand. 
Alternatively, foreigners may simply convert their financial rand balances into foreign 
exchange in the cash market. This will put downward pressure on the financial rand rate. 
However, since the financial rand rate is higher in the securities market, arbitrageurs will 
bring in foreign currency at the lower cash market rate and buy shares on the JSE 
simultaneously selling them in London. This will put downward pressure on the financial 
rand rate in the securities market, arbitrage being complete when the two rates are 
equated. 
From this discussion it is clear that the financial rand mechanism cushions the domestic 
st9ck market from increased perceptions of risk by foreign investors. 
Having discussed foreign investor's response to increased ris1c:, how then do domestic 
investors respond to the widening of the financial rand discount. 
From Figure 8, the widening of the differential allows lower domestic interest rates. These 
lower rates of interest tend .to raise the value of domestic equities. The reasoning is simply 
this: When interest rates are low, domestic investors seek returns in excess of the rate of 
inflation. They are thus attracted by the high real rates of return on equities. This 
increased demand for equities will tend to bid up their price. 
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On the other hand, when interest rates are high, the opportunity cost of holding shares also 
rises inducing people to sell equities and move into alternative investments e.g. fixed-
interest investments. 
Figure 9 below shows the inverse relationship between the JSE All-Gold Index and the 
90-day B.A. rate. 
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QUANTITY OF EQUITIES 
FIGURE 10: Risk and the Equity Market 
The equity-demand schedule is shown as a downward sloping function of the price of 
equities. As prices fall, the quantity of equities demanded tends to rise. Similarly the 
equity-supply schedule is an upward sloping function of the price of equities. 48 The 
justification for an upward sloping supply schedule is that as prices of shares rise (bull 
market) the supply of shares through rights issues, increases. An increase in risk, R , 
shifts the equity demand schedule outwards and the equity-supply schedule inwards. 
Equations 15(a) and 15(b) below specify the de~and and supply determinants. 
48 
Ed =,f( i , Risk) 
(-) ( +) 
Equation 15(a) 
Es = f( i , Risk) 
(+) (-) 
Equation 15(b) 
Note that this is a static model. At any one point in time, the stock of equities is 
fixed. 
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From Figure 10, the increase in risk shi~ts the supply schedule Es(i 0, Ro) to Es(io, R1) 
and the demand schedule Ed(i 0, Ro) to Ed(i 0, R 1) • Assuming domestic interest rates 
remain unchanged at i O , the effect of these shifts in demand and supply is a rise in the 
price of equities. 
Thus, the financial rand mechanism cushions the domestic share market from increases in 
perceived risk. 
4.1.4 Covered Interest Rate Parity and Forward Exchange 
Losses 
Recent developments in the internati~nal community have ·raised doubts about the 
insulation properties of the financial rand mechanism. Foreign interest rate increases have 
recently been followed by similar increases in domestic interest rates. The reason for this 
can be attributed to Reserve Bank intervention in the forward market and the resulting 
forward losses. 
The rationale for this argument is given in the October United Bank Economic 
Perspective. It is argued that in order for the Reserve Bank to balance its forward books, 
nominal interest rates must increase. Utilizing the covered-interest parity condition the 
adjustment mechanism is discussed. 
Coverered Interest Rate Parity : 
where: 
. .* F - S 
1-1 =--s 
F - forward exchange rate 
S - spot exchange rate ( defined as the domestic price per unit of foreign 
currency). 
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From the above expression the forward rate is determined by the nominal interest rate 
differential between two countries e.g.: South Africa and the United States. However, if 
the forward rate is quoted below the expected future spot rate, foreign exchange losses are 
made. Therefore, in order to prevent these losses, the domestic interest rate must rise. 
It is this intervention in the forward market that comes under criticism. A market 
determined forward rate overcomes these forward losses due to the intervention of market 
forces. 
Consider the following hypothetical example. Assume that on any one particular day the 
following rates are quoted. 
Spot exchange rate = R2.60/1$ 
Forward exchange rate = R2.70/1$ 
Furthermore, assume now that the expected future spot rate is R2.80/1$. Speculators will 
then buy $'s forward at R2.70/1$ and sell these $'sin the future spot market at R2.80/1$. 
A profit is made. 
The increased demand for $'s will push up its price until the forward rate equals the 
expected future spot rate. In order for the covered interest parity condition to hold, 
without any change in domestic interest rates, the spot exchange rate must depreciate 
(speculators will sell rands or buy $'s spot). 
From the covered interest parity condition, it is clear that nominal interest rates could be 
increased to prevent losses on forward cover or alternatively for spot rates to depreciate 
where forward rates are market determined. 
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It is this latter option that appears to be more plausable given the workings of the dual 
exchange rate mechanism. Any foreign interest rate shock need not be accompanied by a 
rise in domestic interest rates. The adjustment merely takes place through the 
depreciating financial rand. 
The linkage between the· forward market and the financial rand market can be shown via 
the following equations. 
Forward Market : 
Financial Rand Market : 







In response to a foreign interest rate increase, the spot exchange rate will depreciate in 
Equation 16 for the reasons discussed above. 
In Equation 17, the rate of return to foreign investment will increase due to the 
depreciation of the financial rand (respon~e to foreign interest rate increase). 
The notational adjustment is then giv~n as : 
Forward Market : 
Financial Rand Market : 







From Equation 16(a), if the spot rate depreciates the forward rate may also change. 
However, the rate of return to foreign investors will still increase in Equation 17(a) 
provided that 
Ir (CRe = F) < Ir (FR) . 
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SECTION 5 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper has emphasized the insulation properties of dual market systems. Since there 
are in principle two implicit underlying assumptions regarding the effectiveness of two-tier 
systems these were discussed in Section 2. 
In reality however, since complete market seperation and a neutral intervention policy 
don't exist, it has become necessary to impose quantitative restrictions in the form of 
exchange controls. 
Furthermore, an implication of the theoretical models dealt with, indicate that under a 
two-tier system monetary authorities do have a certain degree of autonomy against 
external constraints. This autonomy translates into the ability of the monetary authorities 
to pursue a monetary policy independent of developments externally. 
Consider for example what effect an increase in foreign interest rates has on the domestic 
economy; notably domestic interest rates. The theoretical models developed by Gros and 
Marion amongst others, indicate that at best , the dual market system will only insulate 
domestic interest rates temporarily. This result is however dependent on certain 
underlying assumptions implicit in their models. Gros assumes that the steady-state 
differential between the official and financial markets is zero. However, in South Africa we 
witness a positive differential. The inference drawn from this, is that what Gros considers 
temporary insulation may well be permanent insulation in the South African case. 
Furthermore, Marion assumes that domestic investors hold foreign assets in their 
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portfolios. Given the fact that in South Africa domestic investors are prevented from 
holding foreign assets due to exchange controls, Marion's conclusions don't seem to apply. 
The regression models used to test the effects of foreign interest rate increases on domestic 
interest rates, supported the hypothesis that domestic interest rates are insulated against 
foreign shocks. Further tests were also conducted to assertain the response of domestic 
interest rates to increased perceptions in risk. If risk increases, the effective rate of return 
to foreigners investing in South Africa must also increase. This is only possible if the 
financial rand rate depreciates. The equation below helps clarify this proc~ss. 
lR ~ l µ = i (~) l 
In the equation above, the financial rand differential widens increasing the effective return 
to foreigners. In this case however, domestic interest rates are unaffected although this 
need not be so. It would be possible for the monetary authorities to set lower domestic 
interest rates provided that the rate of change in the financial rand discount exceeded the 
rate of change in the domestic rate of interest. Since Jr(~) > Jr (i) holds, the above 
equation can be re-written as: 
Turning finally to the equity market, it was argued that any negative sentiment on the 
part of foreign investors would not adversely affect domestic share prices. In fact, if foreign 
perceptions of risk increased, domestic share prices rose. Section 3 of this paper addressed 
the mechanics of the. financial rand mechanism the insulation properties being fully 
developed in Section 4. Quite simply, i{ foreign investors wished to disinvest, they could 
do so either directly through the cash market or through the securities market. In either 
case the net result is the same. 
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Consider a disinvestment via the securities market. The foreigner holding financial rand 
balances would purchase SA shares on the JSE and simultaneously sell these shares in 
London. As a result the financial rand depreciates and domestic share prices rise. 
Finally, as regards Reserve Bank intervention in the forward market, it is argued that this 
intervention dilutes the insulation capabilities of the two-tier system. For this reason it is 
suggested that forward rates be more market determined although this remains an area for 
future research. 
APPENDIX A 
FOREIGN INTEREST RATE SHOCKS AND UNIFIED EXCHANGE RATES 
We consider firstly the effect of a foreign interest rate rise under a uniform flexible 
exchange rate regime. The increase in the foreign interest rate will affect domestic interest 
rates, home good prices and national income. Hence, as the foreign rate rises, tresidents 
seek to increase their holdings of foreign bonds. To discourage this, the domestic interest 
rate ~s affected and the exchange rate depreciates. This depreciation does not restore the 
original rate of return on foreign assets as it does in the dual market; the depreciation 
needed to restore portfolio balance is greater in the case of a uniform flexible exchange rate 
regime. There is consequently a positive net wealth effect which increases consumption 
and domestic prices, as well as national income. 
In addition, if the foreign interest rate rises, the domestic currency value of repatriated 
interest income also rises, further increasing consumption, domestic prices and national 
income. Finally, the domestic price of traded goods rises due to the exchange rate 
depreciation. This price effect shifts demand away from imported goods to domestic goods, 
raising their prices and national production. Thus, in the case of a foreign interest rate 
shock, domestic prices and gross domestic product move in the same direction as the shock. 
The effect on domestic interest rates is, however, uncertain. 1 
In the case of a unified fixed exchange rate regime, an increase in foreign interest rates 
created an immediate capital loss on residents' foreign bond holdings. 2 This negative 
2 
The domestic interest rate may rise initially and then gradually fall as the exchange 
rate depreciates. This is due to the inability of the exchange rate to respond 
instantly to the shock. 
In the case of consols, an increase in the interest rate lowers the value of the bond. 
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wealth effect reduces consumption, domestic prices and national product. The effect on 
domestic interest rates is, however, positive. Hence, a rise in foreign interest rates results 
in a rise in domestic interest rates. There are no interest-income or price effects due to the 
fixed nature of the exchange rate. Hence only wealth effects serve as a channel for 
adjustment. 
It is thus clear that in neither of the above cases does the unified exchange rate regime 
insulate the domestic economy against the foreign shock. 
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APrENDIX B 
THE CHOW TEST1 
The null hypothesis to be tested is 
for the two functions specified in period's I and III. The purpose of the test is to establish 
whether or not the two estimated functions differ significantly. 
Step 1: 
The observations from the two respective periods are "pooled" together from which a new 
regression is constructed. The coefficient, sum of the square residual, and the degrees of 
freedom is presented in the table below for each of the data sources used . 
Step 2: 













Regression analysis is performed on' observations in each period seperately. The relevant 
results are given below : 
PERIOD I 
. "* b1 I;e2 1, 1 1 
tfsa,tfus 0.0503974 27.58855 
BASA90, 0.0990370 22.70782 
USBA90 





















n1 + n2 - 2k 
68 
68 











[rie2 - (rie2 + ~2)] I k 
F* = p 1 2 
(Fie~ + ~eD/ ( n 1 + n2 - 2k) 
The observed F* ratio is compared with the theoretical value of F O 05 ( or other levels of 
' 
significance) with V 1 = k and V 2 = (n1 + n2 - 2k) degrees of freedom. The theoretical 
value of F is the value that defines the critical region of the test (at the chosen level of 
significance). 
If F* > F 0_05 we reject the null hypo.thesis, that is, we accept that the two functions 
differ significantly. 
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